Religion, Law and Ethics -- A Call for Dialogue by Hall, Jerome
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1978
Religion, Law and Ethics -- A Call for Dialogue
Jerome Hall
University of California, Hastings College of the Law*
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Ethics in Religion Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons,
and the Religion Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hall, Jerome, "Religion, Law and Ethics -- A Call for Dialogue" (1978). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 1460.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/1460
Religion, Law and Ethics - A Call
for Dialogue
By JEROmE HALL*
SHE CENTENNIAL of an institution is a time for celebration,
reflection, and reaching out toward new goals or fuller reali-
zation of long recognized objectives. This symposium is one
of the ways Hastings College of the Law is celebrating its centennial
in 1978.
The timeliness of the subject of the symposium - the interre-
lations of religion, law, and ethics - is shown in the recent conflu-
ence of many important events. The shocking and tragic actions
of lawyers in high political office have aroused an unprecedented
interest in the ethics of the legal profession. Do secular and pro-
fessional ethics suffice? Does professional responsibility need the
support of religion? Three years ago the Association of American
Law Schools, perhaps influenced by these events, established a Sec-
tion on Law and Religion, and the participation of many theologians
and legal scholars in the Section's annual programs has given ample
evidence of interest in a dialogue on the problems involved in the
interrelations of law and religion.' Simultaneously, at Harvard Uni-
versity there was organized a Committee on Religion and Law. On
a Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Dis-
tinguished Service Professor Emeritus, Indiana University. Ph.B. 1922; J.D. 1923,
University of Chicago; S.J.D., Harvard University, 1935; Jur. Sc.D., Columbia Univer-
sity, 1935; LL.D. (h.c.) University of North Dakota, 1957; LL.D. (h.c.) Tilbingen,
1978. Member, China Academy, since 1968; Director, Council on Religion and Law,
Inc., since 1977; President, American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy, 1967-
69; President, American Section, International Association for Legal and Social Philoso-
phy, 1966-68. Author, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1960), CoM-
rARATIvE LAw AND SocIAL THEORY (1963), FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1973),
and other books. Editor, 20TH CENTRY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SEMES (8 vols.).
1. Papers presented at annual meetings have been published in 27 J. LEGAL EDUC.
380-89 (1976) and in 26 CAn-. U.L. REv. 17-72 (1976). The essays on Hindu Law
and Islamic Law in this symposium are based on papers presented at the 1976 meeting
of the Association.
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March 5 and 6, 1977, this Committee sponsored a symposium on
theology and law focused on "Responsibilities of Vocation," and on
April 1, 1977, the Council on Religion and Law, Inc., was organ-
ized, a board of directors was selected, and a nationwide program
was inaugurated. These events have made it quite clear that the
interrelations of religion, ethics, and law involve not only questions
of professional responsibility but also basic problems of theory and
scholarship.
Participants in the Dialogue
The time has come for a sustained dialogue on this large sub-
ject, and in my view the participants should include representatives
of all the major religions. Accordingly, the articles in this sympo-
sium represent the variety of beliefs expressed in most of the world
religions. The desirability of such wide representation was also sup-
ported by the fact that in this country, and perhaps especially in Cal-
ifornia, there are many persons whose religious background is either
Asian or bound to their American Indian heritage, and all of these
religions are represented in the Hastings student body.
For many years theologians and other scholars, East and West,
have studied religions other than their own; presumably one's appre-
ciation of his or her religion is deepened by such comparative study.
And for some, in this ever-contracting world, there is the hope of
a world religion that, perhaps growing from or centered in their own
religion, will stimulate universal fraternal attitudes and mitigate the
positivistic tendencies of our times. Others think that pluralism in
religion, as elsewhere, is more interesting and desirable, but all can
agree that it is an enlightening experience to discover many similar-
ities among the world religions.2
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam share the Old Testament, and
even a superficial acquaintance with the religions of other cultures
turns up interesting facts and similar beliefs, as, for example, the
promised help in times of unrighteousness and the incarnation of
2. "The Humble, Meek, Merciful, Just, Pious and Devout Souls, are everywhere
of one Religion; and when Death has taken off the Mask, they will know one another,
tho' the divers Liveries they wear here makes them Strangers." WILLIAM PENN, SOMIE
FRUITS OF SOLITUDE, pt. 1, No. 519, at 99-100 (1900) (1st ed. London 1718).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
Krishna, 3 a similar tradition of the ancient Greeks,4 and Buddha's
allegedly mysterious birth with simultaneous miracles; 5 certainly,
Buddha's compassion is universally appreciated. The stages of life
and the paths to moral development marked out in Hinduism and
in other Eastern religions also suggest interesting comparisons with
Western religions. And for philosophically minded persons who re-
ject simplistic conceptions of God, Hinduism may offer a persuasive
metaphysics, not as a pantheistic substitute for a personal God, but
as an enlargement of their intuitive view of reality.
There are also interesting aspects of comparative law that have
been influenced by religion. In the traditional law of Far Eastern
countries the eldest son received all of his father's estate but shared
that property with his kin. The reasons for this preference were
that the eldest son was depended on for the observance of the re-
ligious rites for the dead and was to be the religious head of the
family. American lawyers are surprised to find that in Japan and
other Oriental countries lawyers are less than one-tenth as numerous
in proportion to population as they are in the United States. The
traditional reliance on mediation and the attitude that it is shameful
to resort to law reflect moral and religious beliefs originating in
ancient China. It is noteworthy, also, that while Western theories
of law stress its imperative character, which is as true of St. Thomas
as it is of legal positivists, Eastern thought, particularly as Sir Henry
Maine has shown, assimilated law to custom rather than to commands
of the Sovereign. 6 The affinity of Western jurisprudence and West-
ern theology that views God as a commander, viz., the Ten Com-
mandments, is plain; that concept of God is not central in Eastern
religion. To these observations regarding comparative religion and
comparative law must be added the fact that Japan, South Korea,
3. Thm BHAGAVAD GiTXT 4:7-8 (2d ed. S. Radhakrishnan trans. 1970).
4. "Little more than a century after [Empedocles'] death, stories were already in
circulation which told how he had stayed the winds by his magic, how he had restored
to life a woman who no longer breathed, and how he then vanished bodily from this
mortal world and became a god." E. DoDDs, THE GREESs AND THE IRRAIONAL 145
(1968).
The incarnation of a deity in human form is common in "rude society." 1 J.
FRAzER, THE GOLDEN BOUGH, pts. 1 and 2, THE MAGIC ART AND EVOLUTION OF Ki'Gs
376 (3d ed. 1911). See also id. at 386-421; 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHIcs
183-84 (J. Hastings ed. 1915); THE M=TH OF GOD INCARNATE (J. Hick ed. 1977).
5. See S. RADHAausHNAN, EAsTERN RELIGIONS AND WEsTERN THOUGHT 177 (2d
ed. 1940).
6. H. MAn;E, EAnLy IsToRY OF INSTITUTIONS Lect. XII (1875).
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India, and other Eastern countries have adopted Western systems of
law. This may indicate the greater influence of economics over that
of religion. But before a solution can be reached it will be necessary
to discover how those Western codes actually function in their East-
ern environment; "law in the books" must be distinguished from liv-
ing law.
One of the guiding lines determining the order of the following
articles in the symposium is chronological. Among the world re-
ligions, Hinduism is one of the oldest-the pre-Vedas extend back
perhaps to 2000 BC. A span of more than 1,000 years separates the
earliest books of the Old Testament from the latest. Buddhism arose
in the sixth century B.C., but because it grew from Hinduism and
because Confucius is next in line (551-479 B.C.), followed shortly by
Taoism and because all are Asian, the article on China is placed after
that on Hinduism. The essay on Judaism opens the next section,
and it is followed by essays on Catholic views of theology, law, and
canon law and by one on Islamic theology and law whose roots extend
to 610 A.D. 7  This section of the symposium, guided partly by chron-
ology and partly by the affinity of culture and theme, opens large
vistas. The essay on Paul deals with problems that for centuries
have greatly concerned theologians; focused on "law and faith," they
also raise legal issues regarding law and discretion that have agitated
legal thought from Plato's Statesman to the present day. The essay
on Paul is followed by the article on Erasmus and by two essays on
Luther's theology, especially his interpretation of Romans. The re-
maining essays deal with sensitive moral and religious problems-with
human suffering, as dramatized in Job, and with justice, conscience,
and various aspects of professional responsibility.
In this symposium ancient professions are represented - the
lawyer, the clergy, and the scholar in law, theology, or moral phi-
losophy. In the exchange among the practitioners, the clergy will
probably emphasize religious ideals that, presumably, will sensitize
lawyers to act with reference to needs regarding which doubt and
inertia would otherwise deter the ethically required actions. The
lawyers' contribution to the clergy might center on the "rule of law"
and the thesis that faith alone, precious as it is, does not suffice. Law
makes liberty possible, including the freedom to worship as one
7. HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD 299-316 (I.al FfrniqT
ed. 1974).
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pleases and to establish and maintain churches; it supplies the struc-
tures that are essential to their operation, and beyond that, it helps
to actualize justice and the "inalienable rights" enjoined in religion
and ethics." Because of their training and the nature of their work,
lawyers may also be expected to join rationalist philosophers in raising
many critical questions about theology.
The scholars in law, theology, or ethics are not practitioners in
the sense that lawyers and clergy practice their vocations; they are
theorists who bring what knowledge they have to a better under-
standing of law, religion, and ethics. Their influence, therefore, is
indirect and depends on the use of that knowledge by the practi-
tioners. These professions obviously perform functions that, judged
by their antiquity and universality, serve permanent needs of human
beings in all societies.
Interdisciplinary Knowledge and the Language Problem
In the envisioned dialogue, the members of each profession have
essential roles and functions. What is involved in the interrelations
of their respective disciplines? For more than half a century there
has been much talk of "interdisciplinary" study, but no theory of such
study or knowledge has been widely recognized, much less accepted.
There was, to be sure, the Unity of Science movement espoused,
among others, by Otto Neurath. That movement, however, involved
the reduction of all concepts to physicalist terms; unacceptable to
humanist social scientists, it would find even less favor among those
concerned with the interrelations of law and religion.
Although we lack a theory of interdisciplinary knowledge, we
can learn some important truths from specific researches in which a
specialist in one discipline drew on other disciplines to enlighten his
subject.9 A legal scholar, puzzled by certain phases of his field of
specialization, might draw on history, social science theories of the
"case history," methods of empirical research, statistics, and the phil-
8. For the influence of law on and in religion, see H. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION
OF LAW AND RELIGION ch. 3 (1974). For a critical view of Indian religions and ethics,
see A. DANTO, MYsTIcism AND MORALITY (1972).
9. See J. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SocE1= (2d ed. 1952); H. KALVEN & H.
ZEIsEL, THE AMERICAN JuRY (1966); K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE
WAY (1941).
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osophy of science. He secures a deeper understanding of the law
than restriction to the legal materials allows and an intuitive knowl-
edge that accumulates as he probes one or more nonlegal disciplines.
The legal scholar also discovers that it is impossible simply to "lift"
the findings and theories of those disciplines and "impose" them on
legal problems; not only do we not find ready-made solutions, we
must often reject or adapt what we do find to the requirements of
our own discipline. For example, lawyers interested in criminal re-
sponsibility who read books on psychiatry should be cognizant of
the fact that there are different schools of psychiatry and that the
deterministic postulate of psychiatry does not conform to the moral
principles of the law, especially criminal law.' 0 He also must be
sensitive to the fact of diverging or conflicting views within each
discipline; there are at least as many theologies, some of them within
the same denomination, as there are sharply opposed philosophies
of law. We also learn that it is necessary to keep a firm hold on
the distinctive concepts of one's discipline to avoid their dissolution
in the terms of a different discipline, as ethics has sometimes disap-
peared in the facts of evolution or in other facts that were substituted
for moral norms and as legal rules dissolved in behavioristic sociol-
ogies of law.
In most sociolegal research, there seems to have been no felt
linguistic or conceptual problem about the term "law" or about the
social disciplines. It was simply assumed that certain statutes and
judicial decisions expressed in sanctioned rules issuing from and en-
forced by the government were laws and that economic history, psy-
chiatry and sociology were likewise readily determinable. In any
serious dialogue on law and religion, however, difficult language prob-
lems are obviously encountered. Genuine dialogue is communica-
tion, and the primary question, therefore, concerns the conditions
that make communication possible.
The first difficulty met in an effort to establish the necessary
conditions results from the fact that it is impossible to separate re-
ligious language, legal language, and ethical discourse. Take the
Ten Commandments. For the believer they were promulgated by
God and therefore belong to "religion." But some of them were en-
forced by the political authority of the time, for example, "Thou
shalt not steal." This suggests that we should distinguish commands
10. J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 455 (2d ed. 1960).
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expressed in terms of love or in terms of purely internal states from
those that are amenable to secular enforcement. Yet, even that
distinction raises problems when canon law, church regulations, and
penances are compared with the laws and practices of government."'
The task is also complicated by the fact that Western religions were
influenced by, and incorporated much of, Greek philosophy and
Roman law.12 Many of Plato's and Aristotle's ethical concepts and
principles, for example, voluntary, involuntary and mixed acts, neg-
ligence, and punishment, were taken over by Western ethics and re-
ligion. Plainly, the need is for a set of definitions of the concepts
of religion, law, and ethics that will allow one to make sense of in-
quiries into their interrelations.
The principal direction of the required analysis is determined
by the fact that the essence of communication is the sharing of com-
mon ideas. Interdisciplinary dialogue must start with common mean-
ings and then elucidate the distinctive concepts of the various dis-
ciplines by rendering them common by illustration, by reference to
shared experiences, and by the use of intuition, analogies, and other
devices. There is a set of widely shared secular moral principles.
The concept of rule, linguistically represented by prescriptions or
injunctions, is found in the three fields and disciplines as are the
so-called "performatives" expressed in promises. "Sanction" is a pri-
vation in all the disciplines, but the sanction of religion is postponed
to Judgment Day while the exigencies of survival require legal sanc-
tions here and now. The legal sanction is inexorable in its meaning
though not in actual practice; the divine sanction is a matter of grace
and mystery.
The most important concepts are "religion," faith," and "law,"
each of which has been defined in dozens of ways. It is an easy
solution to say that a writer may define these terms in any way he
pleases, but the fact is that unless he defines them in significant
terms, genuine dialogue is impossible, and significance, in my view,
11. For a discussion of R. Sohm's interpretation, see J. ADAMS, ON BEING HUMAN
RELIGIOUSLY ch. 13 (1976).
12. "The Roman Christians . . . thought as lawyers, in terms of legal concepts,
with no mysticism." J. RANDALL, JR., THE ROLE OF KNOwLEDGE IN WESTERN RELIGION
38 (1958).
"As soon then as [the Western provinces] ceased to sit at the feet of the Greeks
and began to ponder out a theology of their own, the theology proved to be permeated
with forensic ideas and couched in a forensic phraseology." H. MAM-E, ANCIENT LAW
363-64 (London 1861).
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is determined by three factors. First, the definition should reflect
sensitivity to the relevant linguistic history during which certain con-
notations gathered around these terms; second, the definition should
represent current thought, interests, and problems; and third, it should
indicate the philosophical perspective of the writer. I have discussed
the meaning of "positive law" elsewhere in detail3 where I took a
natural law direction, and I shall shortly say what I mean by "faith."
In this endeavor and especially in the interpretation of religious
and legal texts, we must deal explicitly with the language problem.
Each profession has its authoritative texts - the Constitution, stat-
utes, and decisions in the one case, the Bible, theological statements,
and the Church's pronouncements in the other. One profession
speaks of "statutory construction," the other in terms of "exegesis"
and "hermeneutics." 14 Exegesis is closer to statutory construction
while hermeneutics is wide-ranging elucidation that takes account
of a writer's psychology and contemporary historical and cultural
situations. Current hermeneutical theories had their origin in the
post-Kantian distinction between natural science and the cultural
disciplines. The former is marked by observation of external facts,
while the latter operate by empathy, by sympathetic participation
in other persons' lives and actions. Kant's Critique, which made
mind the central factor in knowledge of the world, was in later in-
terpretations supplemented by a more adequate psychology of the
authors of biblical or theological statements, and if history is but
the actualization of mind, hermeneutics in that view depends finally
on psychology. Later ideological developments reverted to realism
and still others to a synthesis of the two perspectives.
Corresponding to these movements in philosophy and histori-
ography, biblical hermeneutics became objective or subjective, con-
servative or liberal, social or individualistic. There are many other
divergencies; for example, some theologians remain entirely within
the text of the Bible, playing "the language game" strictly by internal
distinctive rules, while others consult history, psychology, current
situations, and personal motivation. Some exegetes take every word
in the Bible as inspired by God; others distinguish the Ten Command-
ments and the Sermon on the Mount from prescriptions about women,
13. J. HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1973).
14. See Grislis, The Hermeneutical Problem in Richard Hooker, in STUDIES IN
RICHARD HOOKER 159 (W. Hill ed. 1972). See also SRI AUOBINDO, ON THE VEDA
36-37, 55-57, 69, 379-81 (1964).
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witches, and sexual offenses. Recent linguistic philosophy treated
religious language from the perspective of the external observer and
held that it was prescriptive or exhortative or emotional but not de-
scriptive; it did not state or imply any facts. This fallacy, and es-
pecially the failure to realize that the believer's faith causes him to
interpret religious language uniquely, underlines the essential role
of empathy in any realistic hermeneutics.
Against these brief observations on theological hermeneutics,
some comparisons with legal language and interpretation may be
suggested. Biblical language is often concrete and pictorial while
legal language is typically abstract. Biblical language expresses
emotion, reverence, and prayer, but both biblical language and legal
language abound in prescriptions and performatives, and if we take
account of what transpires in court, there are also expressions of
emotion, and a litigant may "pray" that the court grant his request.
Just as biblical exegetes have distinguished different types of
religious language so, in law, one may classify legal language as or-
dinary speech, as technical "words of art" that may be common law
or professional terms, or as legislative terms. The interpretation of
legal texts varies, at least as regards the attitude of judges, in rela-
tion to whether the text is part of a constitution or a statute or a
decision; and again, as regards statutes, interpretation varies depend-
ing on whether the statute -is penal or civil. Able judges do not
find treatises on statutory construction helpful. It is to these judges
rather than to those treatises that one must go for insights paralleling
those found in theology. Holmes placed his finger on the crux of
legal interpretation when he said, "[T]he meaning of a sentence is
to be felt rather than to be proved .... ,1 Frankfurter added fur-
ther insights: "[T]he troublesome phase of construction is the de-
termination of the extent to which extraneous documentation and
external circumstances may be allowed to infiltrate the text on the
theory that they were part of it ... ."6 "There are varying shades
of compulsion for judges behind different words, differences that are
due to the words themselves, their setting in a text, their setting
in history."17  These comments point to subtleties that escape those
who take the canons literally.
15. United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 496 (1911).
16. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLum. L. REv.
527, 529 (1947).
17. Id. at 534.
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Are there parallels or analogies between biblical parables and
legal fictions? A parable, for example, that of the prodigal son, is
true not in the sense that those facts actually happened but in the
sense of communicating a truth about God. A legal fiction, for ex-
ample, that a landowner who maintains an attractive nuisance has
"invited" children to go on his land, is literally fictitious but is known
to be such and is used to effect a just result that requires one to
treat situation A "as if" it were actually situation B. In a case where
the defendants took a horse and buggy for a joyride, intending to
return them, they later decided to sell the buggy, at which time the
required mens rea concurred with the act of taking viewed as a "con-
tinuing trespass," and they were guilty of larceny.18
Closer to the parable are the hypothetical facts judges sometimes
pose to make a point. For example, in the Evans case" a federal
statute forbade bringing in aliens illegally and also forbade harbor-
ing such aliens, but the penalty clause referred only to the illegal
bringing in of aliens. In rejecting the prosecution's argument that
the penalty clause also applied to the harboring, the court stated a
set of hypothetical facts. Suppose, it said, an innkeeper knowingly
furnishes lodging to an alien whose visa has expired. To treat such
a harboring as seriously as the bringing in and to apply the same
penalty - five years' imprisonment - to both would be unreasonable
and is therefore a matter for legislation not for adjudication.
In addition to Brandeis briefs and cases where judges have
probed legislative histories, legal hermeneutics has been most ad-
vanced in case histories of important decisions, "2 in detailed studies
by social scientists of judges and their past decisions with a view
to predicting future decisions, and in occasional ventures into cul-
tural legal history where not only the statutes and decisions were
carefully analyzed but also political, economic, and psychological
factors were explored. Biblical hermeneutics has much to offer in
the further advance of legal interpretation, and the ultimate chal-
lenge is an inclusive theory of language.
18. Commonwealth v. White, 65 Mass. (11 Cush.) 483 (1853).
19. United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948).
20. See, e.g., J. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCiETY 3-33 (2d ed. 1952) (discussing
Carrier's Case, Y.B. 13 Edw. IV, f.9, pl. 5 (1473)).
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Specific Problems
What specific problems might profitably be addressed in a di-
alogue on the interrelations of religion, law, and ethics? The in-
fluence of religion is so pervasive that it is impossible to limit its
impact on law to any list of specific instances. Thus, William Temple,
Archbishop of Canterbury, stated, "[T]he primary form of love in so-
cial organization is Justice."2 In the American Declaration of In-
dependence, Jefferson wrote that men are endowed by their Creator
with certain inalienable rights, and our Bill of Rights, the English
bills of rights, and similar declarations and laws in other countries
have plainly been influenced by religious ethics and ideals. A Com-
mandment forbids "false witness against your neighbor"; Psalm
15:2-5 enjoins speaking the truth and proscribes slander and taking
a bribe "against the innocent. '" 22 St. Paul said, "[Piutting away false-
hood, let every one speak the truth with his neighbor, for we are
members one of another." Ephesians 4:25. Taking an oath by a wit-
ness in a courtroom, traditionally by reference to "Almighty God,"
or occasionally now in terms of conscience, is also evidence of a direct
influence on procedure. The covenant with God, reaffirmed on the
Mayflower and in Colonial law, 23 includes a religious dimension that
for thousands of years made marriage more than a secular contract
and also influenced the law of divorce and sexual offenses. Some
tinge of that religious connotation may even today account for the
prima facie duty to keep one's promises that distinguishes deonto-
logical from utilitarian ethics.
Among specific branches of the law, the richest mine is in the
area of the influence of religion on criminal law. Pollock and Mait-
land traced the mens rea principle to St. Augustine, who said, "Ream
linguam non facit nisi mens rea,"'2 4 repeated almost verbatim in the
laws of Henry I. There are biblical expressions that might have
21. Quoted in A. T. Denning, The Influence of Religion on Law, Earl Grey
Memorial Lecture no. 33 at 9, King's College Newcastle upon Tyne (1953).
22. All biblical references are to THE NEw OXFORD ANNOTATED BmLE (2d ed.
1971).
23. "[T]he influence of religious ideas in the formative period of American law
was often decisive .... ." R. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 24 (1923).
See also R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE CoMMoN LAw 32-59 (1921) (puritanism and
the law).
24. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 476 § n.5 (2d
ed. 1923).
July 1978] 1267
suggested the mens rea formula, for example, Mark 7:15-23, and
Seneca wrote, "Actio recta non erit, nisi recta fuerit volntas .... ,,26
That the distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita was
lifted from the theological leges mere poenales is also evident.26
There are other concepts of deeper, richer connotation, among them
defilement, sin, guilt, forgiveness, expiation, and punishment; these
concepts lie buried in the long past history of the race, millenia
before anything like public criminal law existed.2  But their influ-
ence is patent and operative in our own times, for example, the guilt
in realization of one's sin or crime, the revulsion experienced when
a murder is committed, and, at the other extreme, the persistence
of the ideal of rehabilitation despite current disappointment with
penal institutions.
Paralleling the concept of defilement is harm; other pairs are
sin-crime and forgiveness-pardon. Each of these concepts shares a
common meaning, and they also have distinctive meanings. Both
aspects call for elucidation by reference, so far as possible, to shared
concepts and experiences. Differences are not annulled in this way.
For example, in theology, sin is a breach of one's relation to God,
while crime is a violation of positive law; in theology forgiveness pre-
cedes or may preclude punishment (except for the expiation or re-
morse of one who appreciates the forgiveness of his sin), but "pardon"
in law may be granted to an innocent person mistakenly convicted.
I turn now to a more general problem: law and faith. "Almost
all of the problems of jurisprudence," said Dean Pound, "come down
to a fundamental one of rule and discretion, of administration of
justice by law and administration of justice by the more or less
trained intuition of experienced magistrates."2' S This problem was
first formulated by Plato in the Statesman where he criticized law
on two grounds: law consists of generalizations that cannot fit the
unique character of the litigants or the particularity of each situation
and, second, law remains fixed while facts, institutions, and needs
change. Plato's preference was for the "Philosopher-King" which
in some contexts of the dialogue meant God. But since there is no
Philosopher-King on earth, or not enough of them, Plato's second
25. 3 EPISTLES OF SENECA 92 line 57 (Loeb Classical Library 1925).
26. For citations to the above historical references, see J. HALL, GENERAL PRIN-
CIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 79-80, 338 n.50 (2d ed. 1960).
27. See P. RICOEUR, THE SYMBOLISM OF EvIL (1967).
28. R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 111 (1922).
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choice was the rule of law; that was best in the imperfect world of
actual states. 29  We are indebted to Aristotle for the first detailed
articulation of equity as "a correction of legal justice," "a correction
of law where it is defective owing to its universality."30
What is the relation of these jurisprudential ideas to biblical
statements and theological discussions of law and faith? Jesus said,
"Think not that I have come to abolish the law and the prophets;
I have come ...to fulfil them." Matthew 5:17. His criticism of
certain laws, for example, those regarding healing on the Sabbath,
washing hands, and the punishment of adultery, resembles current
criticism of outmoded positive laws and penalties that are regarded
as unduly severe.
It is St. Paul's epistles, especially Romans, that have the greatest
interest for dialogue.31  If we are to understand St. Paul's thesis re-
garding law and faith, we must first see what he means by "law."' 2
For Paul, there is "the law of the Spirit," Romans 8:2, which appar-
ently is synonymous with the "law of God," Romans 7:22, 8:7; Luke
10:25-28. "Law" sometimes means moral principles. Again, as a
Pharisee, Paul was familiar with the Torah and the numerous rules
or laws which they promulgated. There was the positive law im-
posed by the ruler, Romans 13, and, finally, that very different law
"in my members," Romans 7:23.33
It is important, next, to keep in mind Paul's statements: "What
then shall we say? That the law is sin? By no means!" Romans
7:7. "The law is spiritual," Romans 7:14; "the law is holy," Romans
29. PLATO, THE COLLECTED DIALOCUES OF PLATO 1063-64, lines 294-95 (E. Ham-
ilton & H. Cairns eds. 1961).
30. ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA bk. V, pt. 10, in THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
(W. Ross trans. 1925).
31. As regards the following comments, I ask the reader's indulgence for an
amateur's use of the dominant conventional interpretation.
32. "Nor must one try to define the law in biblicist terms, such as by identifying
the Old Testament with the law and the New Testament with the gospel, for in fact
the New Testament also contains law in a certain sense, and the Old Testament already
contains the gospel .... [Olne and the same saying can have the effect of the law,
or can be taken as the gospel . . . . [F]or example, one can understand the first
commandment in such a sense that the voice of the gospel is heard in it." C. EBELING,
LuTm 133 (1970).
33. Paul "not infrequently continued to use the Law as authority quite in the
manner of his fathers." A. DIESSMANN, PAUL - A STUDY IN RELIGIOUS HISTORY 99
(2d ed. 1926).
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7:12. He speaks of "the just requirement of the law," Romans 8:4,
and asks, "Is the law then against the promises of God?" And he
answers, "By no means!" Galatians 3:21; Romans 3:31.
What then was Paul's complaint, his cry of despair? Why did
he speak of "the curse of the law"? Galatians 3:13. It was because
the law "in my members," Romans 7:23, tempts transgression and,
given human imperfection, leads inevitably to sin. "[T]he power of
sin is the law," 1 Corinthians 15:56; hence, if judgment is based on
obedience to the law, there is no escape from damnation. By that
test "the whole world may be held accountable to God," Romans
3:19. He anticipates a point made by twentieth century scholars
who said that criminal law is the formal cause of crime in his state-
ment that "where there is no law there is no transgression." Romans
4:15. Salvation, therefore, depends on faith, for Paul, faith in Christ
which saves erring man from the law of sin and death. Romans 8:2.
In sum, "a man is justified by faith apart from works of law." Romans
3:28.
Despite Paul's "By no means!" and his injunction to obey posi-
tive laws because rulers are God's agents, Romans 13:1-7, the "curse
of the law" has been taken as criticism of positive law. Law is said
to be an inadequate vehicle of justice; it is only a compromise among
conflicting interests; many laws become outmoded and, in any case,
law cannot keep abreast of social change; law deals only with ex-
ternal actions, not with conscience or motivation, and so on. Many
of these criticisms have been voiced on moral or practical grounds,
not influenced by Paul's epistles. But the conjunction of Plato's
criticism, Paul's "curse of the law," and secular professional evalua-
tions raise many questions based on the distinctive perspectives of
religion, law, and ethics.
For example, a legal problem currently agitated in many coun-
tries, namely, that of error juris, bears comparison with Paul's thesis.
The traditional rule of law is that ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
In recent years this has been challenged on the ground that many
laws are so obscure or technical that no one, not even lawyers, can
know all of them and also on the ground that by the traditional maxim
even those who have consulted competent lawyers and have followed
their advice have no defense and are thus in a predicament that
parallels the inevitability of transgression emphasized by Paul. One
suggested reform is that serious crimes be set apart from novel ones
or technical infractions and that the traditional rule be retained as
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to the former but not as regards the minor offenses. The 1975 Ger-
man Penal Code totally rejects the traditional law and makes error
juris a defense, limited, however, by the defendant's negligenceY.3
In the legal professional view, the limitations of law are mitigated in
these ways and by the wise use of discretion. Paul was not inter-
ested in mundane reforms; his concern was with ultimate judgment.
In law and ethics, evil and guilt are judged by reference to the past
and future practical needs, while, for Paul, evil and guilt are tied
to hope, the hope of salvation.
Paul's epistles, placed in the wider orbit of religious ethics, sug-
gest many other problems that might be discussed: the importance
of action in the lawyer's perspective versus exclusive concentration
on faith; question about civil disobedience vis-a-vis the ruler's divine
agency; and points where religious ethics seem to contradict the
moral principles expressed in positive law, for example, such precepts
as "resist not evil," "turn the other cheek," "divest yourself of all your
property," and so on. The lawyer, accepting the law of self-defense
and the defense of other persons, the prevention of crime, and many
other rules based on traditional and rationalist morality, may be ex-
pected to ask clergy and theologians to clarify this problem, and the
rationalist moral philosopher may be expected to raise questions
about biblical views of sex, women, slavery, and civic duties. He
might also say, "to forgive one who has harmed me is a valid moral
precept, but am I in a moral position to forgive one who has harmed
another person?" Are the contradictions only superficial or must we
reject one or the other morality? Finally, there are larger questions
such as the relevance of religion to political and economic issues in
a modern industrial society.
Perennial Problems
I wish finally to discuss problems that every thoughtful person
faces regardless of his vocation; one's stand on these issues will in-
fluence his position regarding all other questions. At the heart of
these problems is the question of religious faith, and pursuant to the
canon suggested above, I shall say what I mean by "faith." Before
doing that, however, it should be noted that there is no debate in
34. See Arzt, Ignorance or Mistake of Law, 24 Am. J. COMP. L. 646 (1976); Hall,
Comment on Error Juris, 24 Am. J. CoMP. L. 680 (1976).
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the Bible about the existence of God. It never occurred to the
Prophets of the Old Testament or the Apostles of the New Testament
to question the existence of God; that was assumed to be as certain
as the existence of the land, stars, and one's neighbors. But skeptics
(and every thoughtful person is sometimes skeptical) have raised
serious questions about the rationality of faith.
In elucidating the meaning of "faith," the first need is to dis-
tinguish faith as belief in certain propositions, for example, that God
exists, from faith as an experience and commitment. If both mean-
ings are included in a definition of "faith," faith is (1) belief in the
existence and supreme goodness of a transcendent Personality, there-
fore worthy of worship; (2) belief in the eventual vindication and
victory of goodness over evil; (3) belief in the progressive fulfillment
or actualization of one's potentialities; (4) the experience of an I-
Thou relation that, for the believer, is an experience of the presence
of God; and (5) a commitment of the whole person, involving emo-
tion, need, hope, and unlimited awe and reverence.
What follows regarding faith is not meant to be a psychological
description of the process of actually becoming religious. When I
speak of the "leap to faith," I do not mean to imply that one first
examines the rational grounds of faith and then decides to become
a believer; nor do I imply that such a decision is irrational .3 Faith
may be an unsought gift or it may result from conditioning in child-
hood or from one's later experience.3 6  The following is the kind of
analysis of the rational components of faith that lawyers are trained
to evaluate.
The lawyer's professional work develops a rationalist mentality
because, except for occasional vestiges and the weight of historical
accident, our legal system is a rational body of rules, principles, and
procedures. Lawyers are familiar with rules of evidence and rational
modes of proof and persuasion. They know that there are differences
in the degree of persuasion involved in a civil suit, in certain excep-
tional civil actions such as fraud, and in a criminal prosecution.
These differences are formulated in terms of "preponderance of the
35. Even so staunch a rationalist as Brand Blanshard wrote, "[Tihe very election
of faith as an authority is, if the choice is responsible, itself an act of reason." B.
BLANSHARD, REASON AND BELIEF 277 (1974).
36. For a thoughtful description see Price, Faith and Belief, in FAITH AND THE
P tIosoPHErs 3-25 (J. Hick ed. 1966).
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evidence," "clear and convincing proof," and "proof beyond a reason-
able doubt."3 7  Does the preponderance formula mean that the jury
must only believe that the plaintiff's evidence is more probable than
that offered by the defendant? In this view a jury may not believe
either side but only assess the respective probabilities. This has
suggested an alternative view of the preponderance formula, namely,
that the jury must to some degree believe that the plaintiff's evidence.
is true. "Clear and convincing" evidence has a more subjective ref-
erence to belief than the preponderance formula, but can it be dis-
tinguished from belief "beyond a reasonable doubt"? A logical dis-
tinction might be that "clear and convincing" evidence is compatible
with a reasonable doubt and is thereby distinguishable from the max-
imum degree of belief required in a criminal case. It may be
thought, however, that any doubt sincerely held by normal persons
is a reasonable doubt. Despite these logical and linguistic difficulties
it seems plausible that there are degrees of belief, better described,
perhaps, as degrees of feeling or conviction that elude neat descrip-
tion.38
These legal rules of evidence are reflections of "natural reason,"
and they could enter into dialogues in several ways, for example, to
test the validity of theological arguments for the existence of God
and to distinguish secular beliefs, even those held without any reason-
able doubt, from faith that is so firm (Job's) that it excludes the
slightest shadow of doubt and persists even in the face of evidence
that on rational grounds is plainly contradictory. In these and other
ways the rationality of the law of evidence in the trial of an issue of
fact joins philosophical rationalism in raising pertinent questions
about faith.
Against this background of the rationalism expressed in the law
of evidence and of the above definition of faith, let us consider some
obstacles to religious faith that confront the twentieth century mind,
the most serious of which are the dominating positivist perspective
enforced by popular views of science and the problem of evil. As
to the first problem, it is certain that among educated believers the
ancient "war between science and religion" is a thing of the past.
Within its realm of generalized, verifiable descriptions of perceptible
facts together with the supporting theories and hypotheses, science is
37. McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALrF. L.- Rv. 242 (1944).
38. See State v. Sauer, 38 Minn. 438, 38 N.W. 355 (1888).
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recognized as supreme. One explanation or rationalization of this
opinion is that science has its realm and methods and theology has
its distinctive sphere of relevance and its methods - and never the
twain shall meet; or, better, science and religion are different ways
of interpreting the world. Some theologians, such as Kierkegaard
and Barth, exclude as irrevelevant not only science but also "natural
reason," in which view it follows that none of the so-called proofs
of the existence of God is valid, and, by like token, aggravated by
the difficulty of proving any negative proposition, science cannot
prove that God does not exist.
A different direction, taken by Teilhard de Chardin, among other
scholars, is that God in his infinite time and purpose works through
and in nature, for example, in evolution; the laws and complexities
of nature discovered by scientists only reveal God's greatness and
his consummate artistry. This perspective has the advantage of
avoiding a mental dichotomy.
Skeptics, however, challenge the grounds of any religious faith,
not merely the compatibility of orthodox religion with modern science.
Such twentieth century minds are impressed, perhaps obsessed, by
the fact that microscopic man inhabits a planet that is only a speck
in an inconceivably vast universe; for educated persons the notion
that a gigantic ghost is "out there" above the clouds is fantastic .3
What is prominent and often dominant in the twentieth century is
a positivist cast of mind that is skeptical of nonperceptible reality and
intuitive knowledge and especially of any claim of mystical experience.
What can be said to these intellectuals in justification of one's
faith? First, there is the undeniable fact that, as Plato put it, the
world is a cosmos, not chaos. Einstein, striking a similar note, said
that the most incomprehensible fact of the universe is that it is com-
prehensible. These statements by Plato and Einstein, separated
though they are by thousands of years, point to one plank that the
believer stands on in justification of his faith - order implies mind,
and cosmic order, God's mind.
Although there is widespread skepticism of most of the alleged
"proofs" of the existence of God, there is much appeal in this argu-
ment from purpose or design; even Hume made a grudging con-
39. See J. ROBINSON, HONEST TO GOD (1963).
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cession to the validity of that thesis.40 Order, as shown in the heav-
ens, in the functions of the brain, and the purposive actions of human
beings, is accounted for by the skeptic as the product of chance.
Which is the more probable? Was it an accidental "big bang" that
transformed gaseous matter into organic molecules that culminated
also by chance in homo sapiens? Is it consistent with sole reliance
on the indifference of natural forces that there was an ingredient
in the evolutionary process that emerged in higher forms of life,
culminating in man and civilization? It can hardly be doubted how
jurors would assess the respective probabilities, and since even Hume
gave some weight to the thesis from design, intelligent believers
can hardly be accused of superstition if they find mind, will, and
purpose manifested in the world and regard that as a rational sup-
port of their faith.
The appreciation of cosmic order is also a moving personal ex-
perience, an experience of awe and reverence. The beauty of land-
scapes, woods, oceans, and works of art stimulates not only an
aesthetic response but also a sense of wonder. More wonderful still
are those aspects of human life that are as mysterious as they are
inspiring, for example, the fact that from the union of two micro-
scopic cells should grow a Socrates, a Buddha, a St. Francis. Ap-
preciation of beauty, of the achievements of science, with its impli-
cations for integrity and the value of truth, of countless other achieve-
ments, and, finally, of the wonder, awe, and reverence of creative,
sustaining reality join the intellectual discovery of order and design
to lend additional support to religious faith.4 '
Of equal or even greater importance as a rational step toward,
or ingredient of, faith is that knowledge which, among rationalists
from Plato onward, has formed a bridge from a perceptible world
to transcendent reality, namely, knowledge of the existence or sub-
sistence of relations and values. For example, we see a woman
carrying an infant in her arms, but we do not see that they are
related as mother and child; we apprehend or intuit that relation.
40. "In a word, CLEANTHEs, a man, who follows your hypothesis, is able, perhaps,
to assert, or conjecture, that the universe, sometime, arose from something like de-
sign ..... "Y T~he cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote
analogy to human intelligence ..... " D. Htumm, DLtOGuFs CONCERNING NATURAL
RELIGioN, pts. V & XII at 168-69, 227 (N.K. Smith ed. 1947) (1st ed. London 1779)
(emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
41. For a discussion of the distinctive character of religious awe and wonder, see
H. Lawi, OUR ExPERmn CE oF GoD 107-10 (1959).
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Again, given the propositions that all men are mortal and that Socrates
is a man, we intuit their implication - that Socrates is mortal. There
are innumerable interpersonal relations, and in current theology the
I-Thou relation, in contrast with the I-It relation, is particularly sug-
gestive. These and countless other relations are not merely events
in our minds although, of course, minds are required to discover
them. Nor are relations only words or ways of talking although
speech is the only way to communicate one's apprehension of rela-
tions. Relations "exist" or subsist, and if that is granted, at least as
a tenable rational interpretation, we have taken a long step from the
perceptible world to transcendent reality, although not yet to divine
Reality.
We come next to what for many is even more important in the
justification of their faith, namely, their experience of values. Moral
philosophers have built their systems on various ultimate postulates.
For St. Thomas Aquinas it was a self-evident truth that one should
seek good and avoid evil; Bentham's postulate was the pleasure-pain
principle; for Kant, it was practical reason or what was logically
presupposed in sound moral judgments. With all deference to these
"great dead," it seems preferable to begin at least with one's personal
experience of moral values. Everyone has wanted to do something
or wanted very much not to do something either because of an emo-
tional surge or a bias one way or the other or because of personal
gain. At the same time, unless he is abnormal, he experienced a
sense of duty and often acted in accordance with that obligation,
sometimes against a very strong desire; like relations, obligations are
not perceptible.
Another common experience is the use of moral language.
Hardly a day passes without saying, "That is good, that is bad; I
or he ought or ought not to do that; he should not have done that
or omitted doing that." We praise the self-sacrificing hero and damn
the ruthless dictator. If we are to defend the rationality of these
daily expressions and our moral experience, we must reject the views
(1) that obligation is a kind of desire; (2) that we acted as we did
because we were conditioned to act that way - which only refers
the problem to the past; (3) that moral values and religious experi-
ences are illusions projected from a subconscious need for a father-
substitute; 42 and (4) that our valuations are mere expressions of emo-
42. With reference to Freudian and other causal explanations of religion that trace
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tion or personal taste or of approval or disapproval or exhortation -
though all of these may be involved. We argue about the validity
of moral judgments, but we do not debate matters of personal taste;
we do not argue with those who like raw fish, but we do argue for
the validity of valuations supported by relevant facts.
What was said above about the subsistence of relations also ap-
plies to values. When we say, "There is a good, kind person," or
"He did the right thing," at the same time rejecting the above posi-
tivist interpretations, we are driven to find some kind of existence
for the stated moral qualities or the implied moral laws. Certainly,
they are not figments of one's mind; approval or disapproval, to be
sure, is mental and verbal, but the quality of what is approved or
disapproved is not something that happened in someone's mind. Be-
cause those "somethings" are not perceptible,- we are led again to a
transcendent aspect of the world, a value cosmos.
Not only skeptics but also some rationalists who support the
above indicated metaphysics of relations and values will object that
this does not warrant "spiritualizing" moral values in a mysterious
extra-human realm; why not recognize, as did Durkheim, that values
are made by society? To this, the believer replies first, that man
is part of the world; even if bbligation and other values are man-
made, that fact admits transcendence as part of the world. Second,
even if it is granted that value judgments do not ascribe non-natural
qualities to actions or events and that obligation does not exist apart
from human attitudes, these attitudes must conform to objective
principles or moral laws. These laws or principles are valid by ref-
erence to a reality that includes many facts which are beyond human
creation, for example, the physical world, the structure and vulner-
ability of biological organisms, and the conditions necessary for hu-
man survival. Moreover, the unconditional character and absolute-
ly compelling authority of these laws support the hypothesis of their
dependence on a divine mind.43  Of course, there are other rational
hypotheses about these problems but none can claim the equal sup-
its origin to the child's relationship with his father or to other conditioning, apart from
the question of the validity of those theories, it should be noted that a causal explana-
tion of a belief must be distinguished from its justification. Suppose it to be true
that one's need for a father-substitute and his conditioning in childhood led or caused
him to become a believer. To justify that belief, one needs to give reasons in its
support
43. See A. EwiNG, VALUE AND REALITY 204 (1973).
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port of great rationalist philosophers. Third, one is warranted in
testing faith as a hypothesis by practice that brings further evidence
of its validity. Faith sensitizes the believer to an appreciation of
values that is inaccessible to the skeptic, and not least among the
rational proofs is the satisfaction experienced in the religious life.
In sum, faith is a complex conviction and experience composed of
rational and nonrational, but not irrational, factors. 44 What distin-
guishes positivists, skeptics, and logically bound rationalists from be-
lievers is the fact that those who live religiously preserve a grain of
mysticism that is neither the experience of what a psychiatrist might
call hallucinations, nor an a priori faculty of mind, as Otto argues, 45
but is a kind of insight wrapped in emotion, a sensitivity of imagina-
tion and an unlimited capacity for awe and reverence.
Many readers are, I hope, in substantial agreement with the
foregoing analysis, though they may prefer to stress other matters,
such as the example of parents, their own instinctive turn to prayer
in times of crisis, and their experience of a spiritual quality in I-Thou
relations. Some, perhaps many, will balk at any religious commit-
ment because they cannot reconcile an omniscient, omnipotent, per-
fectly good God with the evil of this world, the disease, famine, war,
hunger, earthquakes, and the miserable lives led by so many millions
of human beings. Worse yet is the history of religious persecution
that extends from the trial of Socrates, "the best man in Athens," and
of many others who challenged Greek religion, to the barbaric treat-
ment of the Christian martyrs; it includes inquisitors and witch hunt-
ers, the wars of religion, and, in the present century, the genocide,
and the existence of organizations dedicated to the destruction of
those espousing other religions - all this in the name of religion!
Indeed, one might well conclude that if this earthly life is the
"end-all" of human existence, it is impossible to reconcile the vast
enormity of evil and pain with omnipotent benevolence. Among
sensitive persons in the twentieth century, the inevitable questions
are: Has religion done more harm than good? Is it not a divisive
force rather than one that fosters fraternal affection? Even if the
achievements of religion, such as respect for personality, the gener-
osity and altruism that often go unnoticed, and the fostering of the
arts, are greatly appreciated - still the question persists as to the
44. See note 35 supra.
45. R. OTTO, THE IDEA OF THE HOLY (2d ed. 1950).
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balance. Specifically, does not Humanism offer more than religion?
Many lawyers come to mind as examples: Clarence Darrow, an
avowed atheist, who was a very compassionate human being; and
Archibald MacLeish, the lawyer-poet whose drama lB ends on a
note of agnosticism or atheism tied to an eloquent expression of love
and compassion for all fellow creatures doomed to suffer the slings
of fortune. No doubt, many other examples could be adduced.
Before the verdict is returned by those who cannot reconcile
the evil of this world with the existence of an omnipotent, perfectly
good Creator, let us pause for further reflection. In the first place,
one must admit that evil sometimes serves a purpose, that facing evil
is a necessary condition of courage, that poverty stimulates altruism,
and that pity and even love are stirred by human suffering and need.
Suffering sensitizes many persons to the troubles and disadvantages
of others. Evil should not be isolated but should be considered in
the full context of the conduct it engenders. Then there is the ques-
tion of human freedom and the consequent imputation of persecution
and much other evil to human beings, not to God. Still, it must be
granted, most of the enormous harm wrought by earthquakes, flood,
and lightning cannot be ascribed to human limitations.
For those who have not experienced the numen or the mysterium
tremendum, something must be added or something must give way.
Among the latter strategies is the belief that God, though perfectly
good, is not omnipotent and that He suffers with suffering men and
women. The difficulty here is that belief in a future in which wrongs
will be righted and goodness prevail implies God's omnipotence.
Despite all, the believer is sustained by an intuitive sense of mystery
and, also, by the fact that the loss of faith would aggravate the pain.
Before the final verdict is rendered, especially regarding perse-
cution and other harms committed by human beings, there are two
additional steps to be taken to narrow the meaning of "religion."
Here, perhaps, jurisprudence can make a contribution to theology,
for in dealing with their subject matter, all legal philosophers are
agreed that before a rule can be called "legal," the system to which
it belongs must be substantially effective. This distinguishes positive
laws from a set of ideals that do not influence conduct. The other
direction is that taken by natural lawyers who, besides using uncon-
troversial criteria, limit "law" to morally valid enactments and de-
cisions.4 6
46. J. HAmL, FOUNDATIONS OF JurISPRUDENCE 21-77 (1973).
July 1978]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
If we apply these restrictions to "religion," several important
consequences follow. "Effectiveness" implies that faith alone does
not suffice to characterize a person as "religious." What counts equal-
ly is action; the test is action that expresses faith. This formula-
tion - action expressing faith - may help to unite those who empha-
size faith and those who stress works. If we also think that the
soundest secular morality is a minimal essential of religion, we will
distinguish "religion" from "cult" in ways that would exclude from
"religion" not only fanatics who have persecuted or discriminated
against persons of different beliefs but also sanctimonious observers
of ritual and dogma.
I have discussed only a few of the problems that would be im-
portant in a dialogue on the interrelations of religion, law, and ethics,
and for the most part I have tried to raise questions rather than to
provide solutions. Discussion groups will differ in their preferences
as to these and other topics they wish to explore. The influence of
religious faith is so pervasive that it should probably be first on any
list of topics to be discussed. Of almost equal importance is the
language problem which involves not only the interpretation of texts
but also interdisciplinary knowledge and the conditions of communi-
cation. The influence of religion on law and the reciprocal influence
of law on religion suggest, first, a concentration on particular fields
of law, then, a study of codes such as those of Hammurabi, Manu, and
parts of the Koran and the Bible, and, thence, a consideration of the
wider questions of law and equity, law and nonlegal agencies, and
law and faith. Relevant in this context would be interrelations of
comparative religion and comparative law. There are also many
social, political, and economic problems that lend themselves to in-
terdisciplinary discussion, and not least in importance among them
are the problems of responsibility and how on that practical level
the professions can best cooperate. The historical approach is im-
portant in the analysis and discussion of all the problems and so, too,
are the views of great theologians, moral philosophers, and legal
scholars.
I believe the time is ripe for a continuous discussion of these
important questions. The interest of theology, ethics, and law and
their interrelations is a sufficient reason for participation; in fact,
many have found the study of these disciplines absorbing and often
fascinating. One may also believe that the knowledge acquired by
[Vol. 29
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members of the learned professions will filter through and be dissem-
inated among large sections of the population, and, having allowed
our hopes to soar, why should we limit them or the influence of the
dialogue in any way or to one country?
Finally, on behalf of the editors of the Hastings Law Journal
and, indeed, of the entire Hastings community, I thank the authors
of the following essays for their distinguished contributions to the
Symposium. I also thank James Luther Adams, Professor Emeritus
in the Harvard Divinity School, who made many helpful suggestions,
and my student assistants - Van H. Cline, a member of the staff of
the Journal, and Margaret Susan Wilson, M.A., California Institute of
Asian Studies. In 1976, I was for five weeks a Resident Scholar in
the Rockefeller Foundation's Center at Bellagio, where the beauty
of the setting was conducive to the study of theology and planning
the Symposium.

